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1 
00:00:00,500 --> 00:00:04,040 
[applause] 
 
2 
00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:08,380 
Well unlike Eric, I will not have a PowerPoint presentation, in part 
because 
 
3 
00:00:08,389 --> 00:00:11,429 
the subject and I'm gonna talk about 
tends to be one that defies 
 
4 
00:00:11,429 --> 00:00:15,509 
PowerPoint or at least imagery. I'm 
discussing international communications 
 
5 
00:00:15,509 --> 00:00:20,300 
in the 20th century as it relates to US 
foreign relations and it tends to fall 
 
6 
00:00:20,300 --> 00:00:24,100 
into either one of you categories: 
submarine cables which go under the 
 
7 
00:00:24,100 --> 00:00:28,029 
water and therefore are invisible or 
high power radio transmitters, which 
 
8 
00:00:28,029 --> 00:00:31,619 
sends signals from one high power radio 
transmitter to another, which also are 
 
9 
00:00:31,619 --> 00:00:36,440 
invisible. Therefore we have nothing to 
be able to point to directly. Before I 
 
10 
00:00:36,440 --> 00:00:43,239 
came down here I checked my mailbox and got the latest CIA FOIA letter 
telling me 
 
11 
00:00:43,239 --> 00:00:48,170 
that my information that I had requested 
for... will not be available, the part that 
 
12 
00:00:48,170 --> 00:00:51,820 
I have wanted. It's still heavily redacted. 
So I'm in the middle of a subject that 
 
13 
00:00:51,820 --> 00:00:55,550 
few historians have really looked at in 
any great detail and the farther forward 
 
14 
00:00:55,550 --> 00:00:59,260 
I go, the closer to the present that I 
get, less and less becomes available, 
 
15 
00:00:59,260 --> 00:01:04,119 
which presents a very interesting challenge. I wanna talk about the 
book project that I'm working 
 
16 
00:01:04,119 --> 00:01:08,799 
on, that I did during the sabbatical and 
then put it into larger context of the 
 
17 
00:01:08,799 --> 00:01:12,520 
overall project that I'm trying to do, 
that I've been trying to do really 
 
18 
00:01:12,520 --> 00:01:17,090 
since I started work on the dissertation 
and coming out of the dissertation. The 
 
19 
00:01:17,090 --> 00:01:20,420 
current book manuscript is an 
examination of U.S. foreign relations 
 
20 
00:01:20,420 --> 00:01:25,560 
between World War I and the end of World 
War II and it's a study of how senior 
 
21 
00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:29,479 
U.S. government and business officials 
came to understand the significance of 
 
22 
00:01:29,479 --> 00:01:33,880 
global communications technology. They 
came to appreciate that this technology 
 
23 
00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:38,409 
was a dual use technology. It had great 
significance for diplomatic and military 
 
24 
00:01:38,409 --> 00:01:42,360 
affairs, the way that a government or a 
nation situates itself in the world 
 
25 
00:01:42,360 --> 00:01:46,119 
relating to other countries and other 
governments and it also had enormous 
 
26 
00:01:46,119 --> 00:01:48,970 
financial and commercial significance, 
because these were the things that 
 
27 
00:01:48,970 --> 00:01:53,799 
allowed businesses and civilizations to 
communicate with one another and as we 
 
28 
00:01:53,799 --> 00:01:57,409 
saw the world globalized in the 
beginning of the 20th century to the 
 
29 
00:01:57,409 --> 00:02:01,000 
extent that it could, up to World War I 
and then as it attempted to recover 
 
30 
00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:04,740 
after World War I, more and more 
officials began to really understand 
 
31 
00:02:04,740 --> 00:02:07,090 
that this was something that was 
critical to being world 
 
32 
00:02:07,090 --> 00:02:11,480 
power. Different powers understood this 
faster and took steps to act with that 
 
33 
00:02:11,480 --> 00:02:15,980 
knowledge sooner, but the United States 
came to understand this during World War I. 
 
34 
00:02:15,980 --> 00:02:19,560 
And so after World War I the U.S. recognized this great significance 
and there were a 
 
35 
00:02:19,569 --> 00:02:22,670 
number of key individuals who identified 
that you needed to have a worldwide 
 
36 
00:02:22,670 --> 00:02:26,230 
network of submarine Telegraph cables 
and needed to have a worldwide network of radio 
 
37 
00:02:26,230 --> 00:02:30,099 
transmitters that would allow 
information to go in and out from the 
 
38 
00:02:30,099 --> 00:02:35,489 
United States in ways that allowed you to 
meet the country's requirements and this 
 
39 
00:02:35,489 --> 00:02:39,549 
is what different officials in the State 
Department realized, different officials 
 
40 
00:02:39,549 --> 00:02:42,620 
within successive presidential 
administrations recognized, and what 
 
41 
00:02:42,620 --> 00:02:45,650 
different officials and the military 
recognized. And so they all recognized it, 
 
42 
00:02:45,650 --> 00:02:48,670 
but they argued about it in different 
ways and sometimes they talked past one 
 
43 
00:02:48,670 --> 00:02:52,290 
each other and sometimes they had a lot 
of things in common with each other. 
 
44 
00:02:52,290 --> 00:02:55,420 
In the end of the day what they wanted to 
do was to make sure that the United 
 
45 
00:02:55,420 --> 00:02:59,349 
States was at the center, the center of 
things, so that as much as possible the 
 
46 
00:02:59,349 --> 00:03:01,970 
United States was at the center of 
global communications not on the 
 
47 
00:03:01,970 --> 00:03:05,549 
periphery, that as much as possible the 
United States was on the leading edge of 
 
48 
00:03:05,549 --> 00:03:10,049 
the technology, as much as possible the 
United States would be free from foreign 
 
49 
00:03:10,049 --> 00:03:13,410 
influence, so that if there was a war 
between some other set of powers, the 
 
50 
00:03:13,410 --> 00:03:16,510 
United States would not be harmed by 
this and if there was another war 
 
51 
00:03:16,510 --> 00:03:19,560 
between the United States and other 
powers, that the other powers would not 
 
52 
00:03:19,560 --> 00:03:24,190 
have some way of harming the United 
States in a means with a tool 
 
53 
00:03:24,190 --> 00:03:28,120 
that had not really been understood or 
appreciated by people today. And get some 
 
54 
00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:31,540 
sense of what that would mean, imagine if 
all of a sudden somebody came running in 
 
55 
00:03:31,540 --> 00:03:34,440 
and said "guys check the Drudge Report, there's something really wild. 
All of the banks 
 
56 
00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:38,010 
have stopped working" and we'd all say 
"what, why, have all the banks shuttered?" "No, the 
 
57 
00:03:38,010 --> 00:03:42,560 
interbank connectivity is gone, some 
sort of hackers set off some sort of thing and 
 
58 
00:03:42,560 --> 00:03:47,000 
the banks can't talk to each other". And we 
would all instantly go "whoa, this is 
 
59 
00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:50,440 
significant, whoa, I never really thought 
that this would be an area of 
 
60 
00:03:50,440 --> 00:03:53,720 
vulnerability", but people worry about 
this today and so this is the kind of 
 
61 
00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:56,280 
thing that people would have worried 
about at that time. Are there ways in 
 
62 
00:03:56,280 --> 00:03:59,410 
which this new technology presents new 
security threats to us that we don't 
 
63 
00:03:59,410 --> 00:04:04,840 
have any reason to really know how to 
deal with? What do we do? So the book that 
 
64 
00:04:04,840 --> 00:04:08,389 
I am constructing out of this goes from 
the twenties through the middle of the 
 
65 
00:04:08,389 --> 00:04:11,859 
1940's and in the 1920's what was going on here was 
 
66 
00:04:11,859 --> 00:04:16,059 
careful attention to international 
conferences where the U.S. and other countries 
 
67 
00:04:16,070 --> 00:04:17,799 
laid out the fundamental structure of 
 
68 
00:04:17,799 --> 00:04:21,430 
the global use of radio communications. 
The International structure that is used 
 
69 
00:04:21,430 --> 00:04:26,770 
for high frequency radio, for all aspects 
of radio, the WiFi connection between 
 
70 
00:04:26,770 --> 00:04:31,319 
this laptop and that router, WiFi 
transmitter up there with your cell 
 
71 
00:04:31,319 --> 00:04:34,710 
phones. All of those things are operating 
on radio frequencies, those radio 
 
72 
00:04:34,710 --> 00:04:40,020 
frequencies were all scheduled around 
the world in agreement in the 1920's 
 
73 
00:04:40,020 --> 00:04:43,260 
and the agreement that was 
reached was originally drawn up by the 
 
74 
00:04:43,270 --> 00:04:47,039 
United States Navy and then that became 
the American diplomatic position and so 
 
75 
00:04:47,039 --> 00:04:51,539 
the world is organized according to the 
needs of the U.S. Navy in the 1920's. 
 
76 
00:04:51,540 --> 00:04:54,620 
there's more to it than that, but 
we're gonna put the Navy out ahead on this one. 
 
77 
00:04:54,629 --> 00:04:58,060 
In the 1930's as the Great 
Depression intensifies, you get the 
 
78 
00:04:58,060 --> 00:05:02,419 
looming aggression that will become a 
great problem here. U.S. officials 
 
79 
00:05:02,419 --> 00:05:05,940 
struggled to find ways to minimize 
foreign influence over communications 
 
80 
00:05:05,940 --> 00:05:09,210 
networks. Are there any dangers that we 
need to worry about? Some of you have 
 
81 
00:05:09,210 --> 00:05:13,020 
heard of the company ITT. Its original 
form was as a giant international 
 
82 
00:05:13,020 --> 00:05:17,090 
communications conglomerate and there 
were grave concerns by some in the U.S. 
 
83 
00:05:17,090 --> 00:05:20,430 
that the people running it we're not 
actually U.S. citizens and that if that 
 
84 
00:05:20,430 --> 00:05:24,729 
company acquired control over different 
international search firms serving the 
 
85 
00:05:24,729 --> 00:05:28,889 
United States, that foreign powers could 
shut the U.S> off from the rest of the 
 
86 
00:05:28,889 --> 00:05:33,610 
world. This led to very bitter fights 
that persisted and remained in place as 
 
87 
00:05:33,610 --> 00:05:37,830 
part of rumors that even today you'll 
find as underlying conspiracy theorists. 
 
88 
00:05:37,830 --> 00:05:41,639 
The ITT executives who knew about the 
Holocaust and were part of it, they 
 
89 
00:05:41,639 --> 00:05:45,919 
monitored things going on, they betrayed 
American officials in Germany, all kinds 
 
90 
00:05:45,919 --> 00:05:49,469 
of rumors that were started in the 
20's and 30's and that then got 
 
91 
00:05:49,469 --> 00:05:55,589 
locked in and remained a part of this sort of interesting 
undercurrents of conspiracy history today. 
 
92 
00:05:55,590 --> 00:05:59,529 
Now, complicating this as well, in the 
Great Depression was the looming 
 
93 
00:05:59,529 --> 00:06:03,050 
collapse of the submarine telegraph 
industry. It was becoming an outdated 
 
94 
00:06:03,050 --> 00:06:07,389 
technology. It was still very important 
and U.S. officials were worried that these 
 
95 
00:06:07,389 --> 00:06:11,419 
companies would go bankrupt, sell their 
assets to foreign powers, and then a 
 
96 
00:06:11,419 --> 00:06:15,690 
critical infrastructure would be in the 
hands of a foreign power. The other 
 
97 
00:06:15,690 --> 00:06:19,029 
alternative was to simply merge them all 
together with radios and to create a 
 
98 
00:06:19,029 --> 00:06:23,409 
giant Monopoly, but even in the midst of 
the new deal that very word was 
 
99 
00:06:23,409 --> 00:06:25,280 
anathema, nobody wanted to be the 
one 
 
100 
00:06:25,280 --> 00:06:28,889 
caused a giant monopoly to come into 
existence and the ending result was that 
 
101 
00:06:28,889 --> 00:06:32,790 
nobody did anything and the full 
business history of that remains to be 
 
102 
00:06:32,790 --> 00:06:37,130 
told. The remainder of the work explores 
the period from the international crises 
 
103 
00:06:37,130 --> 00:06:43,730 
1939, 1940, 1941, through the U.S. 
participation in 1941 to 
 
104 
00:06:43,730 --> 00:06:49,060 
3, 4, and 5. Before the war came, 
U.S. army and navy officials attempted to 
 
105 
00:06:49,060 --> 00:06:52,010 
develop plans for integrating the 
nation's commercial networks into the 
 
106 
00:06:52,010 --> 00:06:55,770 
militaries, so that when war came you 
could simply flip a switch and all 
 
107 
00:06:55,770 --> 00:06:59,940 
of these commercial resources would be 
available to the military. This raised 
 
108 
00:06:59,940 --> 00:07:03,780 
complicated civil military disputes. How 
much can military officers work with 
 
109 
00:07:03,780 --> 00:07:07,760 
civilians in peacetime? What do you do in 
those weird phases between war and peace 
 
110 
00:07:07,760 --> 00:07:12,030 
and times of great crisis? Who's really 
supposed to be in charge when you're in 
 
111 
00:07:12,030 --> 00:07:16,000 
war, civilians or military officials, 
especially when the civilians don't seem 
 
112 
00:07:16,000 --> 00:07:19,280 
to know anything about the subject and 
the army officers in navy officers 
 
113 
00:07:19,280 --> 00:07:23,600 
insist that they know all? Once the U.S. 
enters the war in earnest, the demand 
 
114 
00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:27,500 
for communications far outstrips the 
capability. The preliminary assumptions 
 
115 
00:07:27,500 --> 00:07:31,430 
about who operated what and where proved inadequate. What was supposed 
to be a 
 
116 
00:07:31,430 --> 00:07:36,370 
Navy job turns into an Army job and 
there are grave commercial rivalries 
 
117 
00:07:36,370 --> 00:07:40,640 
with Great Britain that complicated the 
wartime alliance and affected the 
 
118 
00:07:40,640 --> 00:07:44,850 
ability to integrate British and 
American commercial networks into the 
 
119 
00:07:44,850 --> 00:07:48,830 
wartime requirements for all of the 
Allied powers. This would become 
 
120 
00:07:48,830 --> 00:07:52,729 
particularly pronounced in Latin America 
where U.S. officials sought to drive 
 
121 
00:07:52,729 --> 00:07:56,570 
out the Germans, block up the British, and 
bring hemispheric communications under 
 
122 
00:07:56,570 --> 00:08:00,960 
American control. But it became fraught 
with additional difficulties, because 
 
123 
00:08:00,960 --> 00:08:04,140 
then the question was which American 
company was supposed to be the one 
 
124 
00:08:04,140 --> 00:08:08,100 
buying up all these Latin American ones? 
And the ITT folks come back into the 
 
125 
00:08:08,100 --> 00:08:12,200 
story and become a very complicated 
subject that we still have no full 
 
126 
00:08:12,200 --> 00:08:16,720 
accounting of. Subsequent chapters 
examine the diplomatic fight with the 
 
127 
00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:21,100 
British over access to the British 
Empire, to the unclaimed spaces of the world, 
 
128 
00:08:21,100 --> 00:08:23,230 
various neutral powers and 
 
129 
00:08:23,230 --> 00:08:27,270 
countries in the Near East, the internal 
bureaucratic struggles between the 
 
130 
00:08:27,270 --> 00:08:31,490 
military and civilians for who got to 
control policy during the war and after, 
 
131 
00:08:31,490 --> 00:08:34,750 
and their growing concern among 
everyone about the fate of U.S. 
 
132 
00:08:34,750 --> 00:08:39,420 
communications, companies, and interests 
after the war is over 
 
133 
00:08:39,420 --> 00:08:43,400 
temporary solutions to the earlier 
collapse of the submarine telegraph industry 
 
134 
00:08:43,410 --> 00:08:47,800 
meant that when 1945 arrived very 
serious and complicated decisions had to 
 
135 
00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:52,820 
be made. But for equally complex reasons, 
Franklin Roosevelt failed to make a choice, 
 
136 
00:08:52,820 --> 00:08:55,910 
the American officials involved decided 
that they actually didn't know what on 
 
137 
00:08:55,910 --> 00:08:58,920 
earth they were supposed to do and the 
different powers within the executive 
 
138 
00:08:58,920 --> 00:09:02,530 
branch fought each other in public in 
front of Congress, over how they thought 
 
139 
00:09:02,530 --> 00:09:05,910 
it should be done. And the book will 
conclude with an analysis of how U.S. 
 
140 
00:09:05,910 --> 00:09:11,770 
officials resolved in 1945 on what they 
should do with some proposing a massive, 
 
141 
00:09:11,770 --> 00:09:15,250 
massive conglomerate of all 
international companies that were 
 
142 
00:09:15,250 --> 00:09:19,380 
American, that did international 
communications into a single firm, into 
 
143 
00:09:19,380 --> 00:09:23,080 
which the Army's wartime network, the 
largest in the world, larger than even 
 
144 
00:09:23,080 --> 00:09:27,600 
AT&T's would be dumped in and then that 
single giant Monopoly would be partly 
 
145 
00:09:27,600 --> 00:09:31,730 
run and operated and owned by the U.S. 
government, which would mean sotto voce, 
 
146 
00:09:31,730 --> 00:09:35,800 
that the information traveling through the 
network could be made available signals 
 
147 
00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:39,760 
intelligence, but nobody was supposed to 
say that. The end result of all of that 
 
148 
00:09:39,760 --> 00:09:43,610 
was a huge blow up involving the 
attorney general and President Truman 
 
149 
00:09:43,610 --> 00:09:48,380 
and the ultimate solution was the one 
that remained in place and underlies the 
 
150 
00:09:48,380 --> 00:09:51,960 
in worries about American intelligence 
monitoring U.S. communications to the 
 
151 
00:09:51,960 --> 00:09:56,960 
present day. So the deals done in 1945 
are deals that in a way are still with us 
 
152 
00:09:56,960 --> 00:10:00,750 
today. Now this sounds like a very 
particular book, you'd have to know a lot 
 
153 
00:10:00,750 --> 00:10:04,100 
about the history of technology and 
business and communications and foreign 
 
154 
00:10:04,100 --> 00:10:07,710 
relations and military affairs, but let 
me explain briefly why it is that I'm 
 
155 
00:10:07,710 --> 00:10:12,170 
working on this one, 1920's to 
1930's. When I wanted to do was 
 
156 
00:10:12,170 --> 00:10:15,680 
to try to follow up on the questions 
raised in the first book, a study of how 
 
157 
00:10:15,680 --> 00:10:19,890 
the U.S. government worried in World War I about. This how it came to 
discover that this 
 
158 
00:10:19,890 --> 00:10:24,810 
was an important tool to be a world 
power and as I went looking forward 
 
159 
00:10:24,810 --> 00:10:27,460 
to see whether any foreign relations 
historians have worked on it, I 
 
160 
00:10:27,460 --> 00:10:30,040 
discovered that none had, even though 
there were some areas where we knew that 
 
161 
00:10:30,040 --> 00:10:34,070 
there were a lot of things to be puzzled 
out and the more than I dove at this, 
 
162 
00:10:34,070 --> 00:10:36,850 
the more that I found that lots of different 
historians who should have been working 
 
163 
00:10:36,850 --> 00:10:43,170 
on it, weren't. So I began to try not to 
derive a summit of analysis based on 
 
164 
00:10:43,170 --> 00:10:46,900 
existing literature, but instead to 
create the literature that I knew that I 
 
165 
00:10:46,900 --> 00:10:50,529 
needed to write the summit of volume. So 
this is going to be the first of three 
 
166 
00:10:50,529 --> 00:10:54,010 
volumes. Hopefully I'll be able to get 
through all three. The first will be the 
 
167 
00:10:54,010 --> 00:10:59,130 
1920's to the 1940's, the second will then be a study of the early 
 
168 
00:10:59,130 --> 00:11:04,040 
Cold War, from the outbreak of the Cold 
War '45, '46, '47, all the way through the 
 
169 
00:11:04,040 --> 00:11:08,540 
Cuban Missile Crisis when we understand 
 from the Kennedy 
 
170 
00:11:08,540 --> 00:11:12,600 
Tapes, they took time in the midst of 
worrying whether they would all the 
 
171 
00:11:12,600 --> 00:11:15,380 
obliterated, to worry if we get through 
this, 
 
172 
00:11:15,380 --> 00:11:18,740 
how will we make sure in future to be 
able to communicate with the rest of the 
 
173 
00:11:18,740 --> 00:11:22,700 
world in times of great crisis? And they 
actually assigned officials to begin to 
 
174 
00:11:22,700 --> 00:11:25,620 
think about this, even when they were 
wondering whether or not the Soviet 
 
175 
00:11:25,620 --> 00:11:27,470 
Ships would be turning around 
 
176 
00:11:27,470 --> 00:11:31,089 
or whether we'd have to sink them and 
launch World War III. So that made for 
 
177 
00:11:31,089 --> 00:11:34,890 
a good stopping point. The next book 
after that, the third one which I hope to 
 
178 
00:11:34,890 --> 00:11:40,440 
write, will go from the height of the 
Cold War '63, '64, forward to the end of the 
 
179 
00:11:40,440 --> 00:11:44,000 
20th century or at least at the end 
of the Cold War. What I suspect is that I 
 
180 
00:11:44,000 --> 00:11:47,630 
will not be able to write that book. The 
materials available for the second one, 
 
181 
00:11:47,630 --> 00:11:53,250 
1940's and 50's and 60's, 
are now becoming declassified. The file I 
 
182 
00:11:53,250 --> 00:11:57,900 
showed you is based on stuff 1953. The 
CIA continues to be reluctant to release 
 
183 
00:11:57,900 --> 00:12:02,400 
some of that and give you a full or at 
least an interesting story and an 
 
184 
00:12:02,400 --> 00:12:05,240 
interesting example of what I'm 
discovering, 
 
185 
00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:08,850 
I've unearthed evidence that has only been 
declassified in the last 10 years, that 
 
186 
00:12:08,850 --> 00:12:12,120 
the U.S. government worried during the 
Eisenhower administration that the 
 
187 
00:12:12,120 --> 00:12:16,230 
Soviet Union had the ability to jam all 
international radio communications, all 
 
188 
00:12:16,230 --> 00:12:21,330 
of it. So at the outbreak of war the 
United States would have 0 capability of 
 
189 
00:12:21,330 --> 00:12:24,790 
directing its military forces abroad. 
Except through the submarine telegraph 
 
190 
00:12:24,790 --> 00:12:30,510 
cables, which were increasingly outdated 
and which could be cut by ships. If that 
 
191 
00:12:30,510 --> 00:12:33,920 
happened, if the soviets jammed it the 
United States would have 0 trans-pacific 
 
192 
00:12:33,920 --> 00:12:35,920 
communications and 90% 
 
193 
00:12:35,920 --> 00:12:39,790 
loss of its transatlantic communications 
for as long as the Soviet Union wanted 
 
194 
00:12:39,790 --> 00:12:44,279 
that to go on. The full effects of that 
we don't fully know. Half the documents 
 
195 
00:12:44,279 --> 00:12:47,740 
are still classified and some of the 
ones that are declassified still have 
 
196 
00:12:47,740 --> 00:12:51,560 
have redactions in them and I asked the 
CIA and the State Department to arrange 
 
197 
00:12:51,560 --> 00:12:55,410 
for the declassification of a testimony 
by Alan Dulles, the 
 
198 
00:12:55,410 --> 00:13:00,589 
director of the CIA at a National 
Security Council meeting in 1953 and the 
 
199 
00:13:00,589 --> 00:13:05,519 
CIA said "no, we cannot tell you what CIA 
director Allen Dulles told President 
 
200 
00:13:05,519 --> 00:13:09,699 
Dwight Eisenhower in a national security 
council meeting, the full details of 
 
201 
00:13:09,699 --> 00:13:12,579 
which for all other parts of that 
meeting have been released, but whatever 
 
202 
00:13:12,579 --> 00:13:15,850 
Allen Dulles was worried about regarding 
Soviet jamming of international 
 
203 
00:13:15,850 --> 00:13:19,889 
communications, we can't tell you. Maybe 
in a decade, 
 
204 
00:13:19,889 --> 00:13:23,639 
you can ask then". So there's a lot to be 
learned and I appreciate the PDL and the 
 
205 
00:13:23,639 --> 00:13:25,940 
chance to discover what I have 
discovered. There will be a book coming out 
 
206 
00:13:25,940 --> 00:13:28,940 
once I get it all written up, thanks. I'm happy to take questions. 
 
207 
00:13:34,020 --> 00:13:35,120 
Oh I have one. 
 
208 
00:13:35,120 --> 00:13:35,620 
Sure. 
 
209 
00:13:35,620 --> 00:13:44,560 
Can you talk a little bit more about the nature of the archival 
material that you're looking at? Is it all government or..? 
 
210 
00:13:44,560 --> 00:13:48,720 
It's a mixture of both. So the starting 
point is going to be the state 
 
211 
00:13:48,730 --> 00:13:53,500 
department records: RG59 of the National 
Archives, but what one finds in the 
 
212 
00:13:53,500 --> 00:13:56,750 
40's and the 50's is that there 
are now a growing number of participants 
 
213 
00:13:56,750 --> 00:14:00,100 
in the discussions. So the record trail 
leads you into the Department of Defense 
 
214 
00:14:00,100 --> 00:14:04,790 
files, which include both the Office of 
Secretary defense and the individual 
 
215 
00:14:04,790 --> 00:14:10,140 
services. Prior to 1947, it's going to be 
either Army or Navy discussing it 
 
216 
00:14:10,140 --> 00:14:14,400 
directly. It also leads to other 
interested parties. So the Federal 
 
217 
00:14:14,400 --> 00:14:18,590 
Communications Commission is not an organization that really has a 
 
218 
00:14:18,590 --> 00:14:22,080 
good history written of it, but in the 
1930's and the early 40's 
 
219 
00:14:22,080 --> 00:14:26,660 
they made a bid to try to run 
international communications policy, to 
 
220 
00:14:26,660 --> 00:14:31,820 
have a strong say in national security 
decisions about things and I can go into 
 
221 
00:14:31,820 --> 00:14:32,930 
more on that later. 
 
222 
00:14:32,930 --> 00:14:37,420 
It also requires getting into what can 
be gotten into of the personal papers of 
 
223 
00:14:37,420 --> 00:14:42,010 
individuals who've left behind, but also 
some of the corporations. And so I was 
 
224 
00:14:42,010 --> 00:14:47,410 
able to go to the MCI records, which are 
located at the Hagley, the DuPont family 
 
225 
00:14:47,410 --> 00:14:53,100 
estate in Delaware. MCI is the successor 
to all of the other companies through 
 
226 
00:14:53,100 --> 00:14:56,040 
the 30's, 40's, and 50's... 
20's, 30's, 40's, and 50's 
 
227 
00:14:56,040 --> 00:15:00,180 
and 60's and they've got these 
government records and they've got these 
 
228 
00:15:00,180 --> 00:15:04,660 
business records and together with the 
Western Union records at the Smithsonian, 
 
229 
00:15:04,660 --> 00:15:09,000 
that's how we know what we know. 
Unfortunately a great many other records 
 
230 
00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:13,080 
were destroyed. Once the technology was 
old and nobody cared, stuff got chucked 
 
231 
00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:17,320 
out, but as a result there's all kinds of 
stuff don't know and there's all kinds of 
 
232 
00:15:17,320 --> 00:15:20,320 
stuff that we don't know that we don't 
know which makes it even worse. 
 
233 
00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:31,000 
So are the private companies and family archives ore willing to allow 
you access or is there somebody from the CIA running, running, 
running... 
 
234 
00:15:31,000 --> 00:15:31,820 
[laughing] 
 
235 
00:15:31,820 --> 00:15:34,180 
...flat lined out? 
 
236 
00:15:34,180 --> 00:15:39,960 
There is their stuff at the MCI records. 
Some of it just 
 
237 
00:15:39,970 --> 00:15:44,500 
copies of government documents sent as a 
courtesy, things like. And there are some 
 
238 
00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:48,440 
government documents or at least 
corporate halves of government 
 
239 
00:15:48,440 --> 00:15:51,860 
corporation discussions that end up in 
corporate records that maybe shouldn't 
 
240 
00:15:51,860 --> 00:15:56,900 
be there and I'll leave it at that. [laughing] 
 
241 
00:15:56,900 --> 00:16:01,700 
I'm curious, I'm good in asking you to speculate? 
 
242 
00:16:01,700 --> 00:16:02,200 
Sure. 
 
243 
00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:10,060 
When you come across redacted information and there's a sense to it's 
come back in ten years 
 
244 
00:16:10,060 --> 00:16:17,160 
and you undoubtedly got access to information, which ten years ago, 
you couldn't. 
 
245 
00:16:17,160 --> 00:16:25,699 
What's your sense of what's being kept secret at this point, you know 
and 
 
246 
00:16:25,699 --> 00:16:34,159 
when you do finally get access to information are you 
surprised at perhaps it's benign nature or? 
 
247 
00:16:34,160 --> 00:16:43,900 
all of the above, all of the above. In brief, the U.S. government has 
gone back and forth on just how much we're supposed to 
 
248 
00:16:43,900 --> 00:16:48,339 
declassify and they're under president Clinton, discussions under 
Bush, some under 
 
249 
00:16:48,339 --> 00:16:52,290 
President Obama, a push to make it so 
that if it's older than 25 years, it's now 
 
250 
00:16:52,290 --> 00:16:58,179 
incumbent on the agency to justify why 
it must remain classified and that's be declassified and that's been a 
big 
 
251 
00:16:58,179 --> 00:17:01,879 
boon. When I did the dissertation 
research I found a document from 1916 
 
252 
00:17:01,879 --> 00:17:05,399 
that had only the year before been 
declassified, because somebody finally 
 
253 
00:17:05,399 --> 00:17:09,510 
went and had to like check to see why it 
was still classified and what it tends 
 
254 
00:17:09,510 --> 00:17:14,029 
to be his documents that can potentially 
embarrass the USS when dealing with 
 
255 
00:17:14,029 --> 00:17:18,730 
another country, information that is 
signals intelligence, which is a lot of 
 
256 
00:17:18,730 --> 00:17:22,819 
why my stuff is still classified, 
because it relates to "we are learning 
 
257 
00:17:22,819 --> 00:17:27,490 
because we're monitoring" or "we are 
monitoring and thus learning and we 
 
258 
00:17:27,490 --> 00:17:32,669 
don't want to confirm" or it relates to 
nuclear matters or it relates to 
 
259 
00:17:32,669 --> 00:17:43,350 
personally identifiable information. This 
is a letter from the Deputy 
 
260 
00:17:43,350 --> 00:17:47,820 
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence. I 
 
261 
00:17:47,820 --> 00:17:52,350 
knew who it is from other documents, but 
they've blanked his signature because that's 
 
262 
00:17:52,350 --> 00:17:54,159 
personally identifying information. 
 
263 
00:17:54,160 --> 00:18:00,380 
Yeah I'm gonna go and steal an old 
dead guys signature. [laughing] Or this one, 
 
264 
00:18:00,389 --> 00:18:04,760 
Allen Dulles' signature is redacted. 
Why? Well you can't copy Allen Dulles' 
 
265 
00:18:04,760 --> 00:18:09,980 
signature. You might steal his identity. Okay, no, but they're 
following the rules of procedure. 
 
266 
00:18:09,980 --> 00:18:14,740 
Some of it, actually very interesting and 
the best is to get the document that is 
 
267 
00:18:14,740 --> 00:18:19,610 
declassified in one place and partially 
declassified in another and then compare 
 
268 
00:18:19,610 --> 00:18:23,539 
them and say the most important thing in 
that, the thing that was declassified 
 
269 
00:18:23,539 --> 00:18:29,099 
last must be the document part that they 
themselves think is most important. So what is it? 
 
270 
00:18:29,100 --> 00:18:35,450 
And that leads to some very interesting 
discoveries. Yeah. Drew. 
 
271 
00:18:35,450 --> 00:18:42,070 
This is sort of a historian's methodological question I guess and it 
may apply more to your second volume than you first, 
 
272 
00:18:42,120 --> 00:18:47,580 
but do you have sort of a set philosophy for how to deal with those 
[inaudible] records? 
 
273 
00:18:47,580 --> 00:18:53,560 
You know, we're always sort of trying to fill in the blanks of what we 
don't know no matter how accessible our sources are. 
 
274 
00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:58,280 
So is there a standard way that you treat or plan to treat those 
things that you think 
 
275 
00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:01,280 
might critical, but you just don't have? 
 
276 
00:19:01,280 --> 00:19:08,620 
Mostly to -- and is Eric still here? I need Eric, because I need to 
point to Eric to say -- No, I'm actually taking a page out from 
 
277 
00:19:08,620 --> 00:19:14,520 
physicists and astronomers and saying 
are there hints that I'll get 
 
278 
00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:15,440 
someplace else 
 
279 
00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:19,799 
of what this is? Maybe I'm not going 
get to know what it is, but at least I 
 
280 
00:19:19,799 --> 00:19:24,500 
can have some sort of a place holder and 
then when I get into other records, if I find 
 
281 
00:19:24,500 --> 00:19:28,540 
hints that's enough to be able to 
confirm okay well there's something there. 
 
282 
00:19:28,540 --> 00:19:34,700 
So I will then describe it and in its 
absence, note at least the gravitational 
 
283 
00:19:34,700 --> 00:19:38,720 
waves show me that there's disturbance there and there must be a 
planet. I don't 
 
284 
00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:42,250 
know what the plan is, but I'll leave it 
in the narrative and someone else will 
 
285 
00:19:42,250 --> 00:19:45,250 
come along later and discover that. That's what I'm hoping. 
 
286 
00:19:45,250 --> 00:19:47,690 
Great dark matter analogy there. 
 
287 
00:19:47,690 --> 00:19:52,960 
Absolutely, absolutely. The title of the third book: Dark Matter. 
 
288 
00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:55,260 
[laughing] 
 
289 
00:19:55,260 --> 00:20:01,860 
I need cool book titles. Just the movie? I wanted to use matrix for 
the second title and the editor 
 
290 
00:20:01,860 --> 00:20:14,100 
from Oxford University press who handles foreign relations said "no, 
as cool as that is, no we can't use movie titles". [laughing] It will 
looked cliched. Yep. 
 
291 
00:20:14,100 --> 00:20:18,780 
So you talked about the Soviet's ability to jam communications at all 
times. 
 
292 
00:20:18,780 --> 00:20:19,280 
umhmm 
 
293 
00:20:19,280 --> 00:20:25,400 
It kind of sounds like modern day hacking these days and how 
governments {inaudible] to kind of take some steps to prevent that. 
 
294 
00:20:25,400 --> 00:20:25,900 
Yep. 
 
295 
00:20:25,900 --> 00:20:30,260 
I was just wondering what kind of steps would the government at that 
time take? 
 
296 
00:20:30,260 --> 00:20:35,520 
So I have an article that is being considered for publication now that 
addresses exactly that and what we 
 
297 
00:20:35,529 --> 00:20:40,940 
get and this is also of used to historians 
of science, because we don't have historians of science 
 
298 
00:20:40,940 --> 00:20:45,380 
accounts on this. The federal government 
decided to react to this by doing a 
 
299 
00:20:45,389 --> 00:20:51,200 
crash course of directed technological 
research. If in fact the jamming of the 
 
300 
00:20:51,200 --> 00:20:55,370 
radio is occurring at these bands, is 
there a way for us to push the signal 
 
301 
00:20:55,370 --> 00:20:58,610 
into other parts of the radio spectrum to 
make it impossible to jam or at least 
 
302 
00:20:58,610 --> 00:21:01,659 
make it that we can mitigate the jamming 
problems. 
 
303 
00:21:01,659 --> 00:21:06,370 
Forward tropospheric scatter systems, the 
large billboard radio transmitters which 
 
304 
00:21:06,370 --> 00:21:10,390 
we still have been used in some parts of 
the world today, that comes from it. 
 
305 
00:21:10,390 --> 00:21:14,630 
I went looking once I learned of this to 
the historians of radio to see when that 
 
306 
00:21:14,630 --> 00:21:18,480 
technology came out, to see if the radio 
historians had said "yay, it came at this 
 
307 
00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:24,179 
time" and it's sort of virgin birth. It just 
kind of appears. Why? Because the research 
 
308 
00:21:24,179 --> 00:21:28,219 
was classified until it was suddenly 
commercially viable and then it appeared. 
 
309 
00:21:28,220 --> 00:21:34,139 
the Army uses and the military uses a frequency jumping system in,  
SINCGARS is one of the names 
 
310 
00:21:34,139 --> 00:21:37,740 
associated with that. Frequency jumping 
is created in the 50's as a way of 
 
311 
00:21:37,740 --> 00:21:42,490 
dealing with Soviet jamming. We have there are hints-- and Drew, this 
get's back to the point 
 
312 
00:21:42,490 --> 00:21:46,860 
you were making earlier -- there are hints  
that AT&T, which was at this time 
 
313 
00:21:46,860 --> 00:21:54,330 
developing the undersea telephone cable, 
what becomes TAT1,  laid TAT1 and 
 
314 
00:21:54,330 --> 00:21:58,000 
then there was reason to believe from 
the documents hinting, I don't know if I 
 
315 
00:21:58,000 --> 00:22:01,460 
can get the AT&T records to confirm this, 
but there are hints at the Eisenhower 
 
316 
00:22:01,460 --> 00:22:05,889 
administration came to AT&T and said 
"good, now build us more" and that the 
 
317 
00:22:05,889 --> 00:22:09,690 
reason for building them was not the 
commercial viability of these things, but 
 
318 
00:22:09,690 --> 00:22:11,360 
instead national security. 
 
319 
00:22:11,360 --> 00:22:15,210 
"Make it so we don't need the radios if 
we get jammed". And they do. Over ten years they 
 
320 
00:22:15,210 --> 00:22:19,059 
build three more, each successfully more 
powerful than last, pushing the 
 
321 
00:22:19,059 --> 00:22:21,890 
technology forward and their end result: 
 
322 
00:22:21,890 --> 00:22:26,410 
We can call anybody anywhere in the 
world today because the Eisenhower 
 
323 
00:22:26,410 --> 00:22:32,460 
administration said we don't want to be 
cut off. Are there other things? I have hints and whatever 
 
324 
00:22:32,460 --> 00:22:36,350 
Allen Dulles is talking about, but I don't know. Other questions? 
 
 
